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TURNING CARBON INTO GOLD:
INCENTIVIZING THE NEW ALCHEMY
ANTHONY E. CHAVEZ*

ABSTRACT
One approach to help address climate change is carbon capture
and utilization (CCU). CCU involves capturing atmospheric carbon
dioxide and using it to generate marketable products. CCU, however,
needs significant additional research and development to reach its
potential. Development of CCU could yield benefits far in excess of its
actual ability to sequester carbon. Research and development of CCU
could stimulate improvements in carbon capture technologies,
incentivize the capture and sequestration of carbon, and generate
products that can benefit society generally. Nevertheless, most CCU
uses remain only theoretical, or significant barriers prevent their current
implementation.
A number of policy tools are available to incentivize CCU
research: patents, prizes, grants, and tax credits. This article reviews the
strengths and weaknesses of each. Then, it discusses how best to apply
these policies to incentivize a number of possible CCU opportunities,
including construction materials, fuels, chemicals, and algae-derived
products.
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THE NEED TO DEVELOP CCU

Despite recent efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
scientists still project that we will not avoid dangerous climate change.
A means to reduce atmospheric carbon and accelerate carbon dioxide
removal could be carbon utilization – using carbon in marketable
goods. Despite promise in helping to reduce carbon dioxide, the
process and products required for significant carbon utilization remain
undeveloped.

A. Dangerous Climate Change Is Unavoidable
The parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement committed to hold the
rise in warming to “well below 2.0°C.”1 The Paris Agreements and
earlier global pacts targeted a rise of 2.0°C as the level to avoid because
at that level “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system” will be unavoidable.2 Scientists consider warming at this level
to be catastrophic for humans, plants, and animals.3 Some of the
expected consequences of warming at this level include rendering parts
of the planet unlivable; increasing the number of heatwaves, floods,
storms and droughts; and forcing migrations from coastal areas
endangered by sea level rise.4
The parties to the Paris Agreement further agreed to attempt to
hold the temperature rise to 1.5°C.5 Recent analyses indicate that even
warming to the 1.5°C level will cause serious regional consequences,
such as extreme temperature warming, heavy precipitation, and
droughts.6 Furthermore, recent analysis concludes that the climate
could reach tipping points with a rise of between only 1°C to 2°C.7 Such
1. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCC Conference of the Parties, 21st Sess., U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), at art. 2(1)(a) (Paris Agreement)
http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf.
2. Lena R. Boysen et al., The Limits to Global-Warming Mitigation by Terrestrial Carbon
Removal, 5 EARTH’S FUTURE, MAY 17, 2017, 463, 463–474.
3. Laura Millan Lombrana, Global Warming Forecast Improves Slightly after Biden’s
Pledge, BLOOMBERG L. ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (May 4, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/UA8Q-8PU6.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al., GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 8 (2018).
7. Climate tipping points will occur when continued increases in atmospheric greenhouse
gases result in major changes in Earth systems. Sybren Drijfhout et al., Catalogue of Abrupt Shifts
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tipping points could include winter Arctic sea ice loss, abrupt Tibetan
snow melt, permafrost collapse, and Amazon rainforest dieback,
among several others.8
Unfortunately, temperature rises exceeding these levels are
becoming increasingly likely. For instance, scientists estimate that the
likelihood that the global temperature will exceed 1.5°C warming as
soon as 2027 to be 40%.9 Moreover, even exceeding the 2.0°C target is
becoming likely. When considering current national policies, recent
projections hold that by 2100 the global temperature rise will reach as
high as 2.9°C.10 Even when nonbinding national pledges and targets
are factored into the calculation, warming still projects to reach 2.4°C.11

B. The Role of CCU in Responding to Climate Change
Carbon capture and utilization (CCU) can play a significant role
in addressing climate change. While CCU is unlikely to reduce
atmospheric carbon dioxide substantially, it can make a significant
contribution. Maybe more importantly, it can provide additional
benefits: encouraging development of carbon capture technology,
incentivizing carbon dioxide removal installations, and helping offset
emissions from sectors that are difficult to decarbonize. Scientists have
identified a number of possible CCU applications, but they are largely
undeveloped or presently too costly to implement at scale.
1. CCU’s Role in Addressing Climate Change
Carbon capture and utilization attempts to use atmospheric
carbon as a raw material. The National Academy of Sciences defines
CCU as “the manufacture of valuable products from a gaseous carbon
waste feedstock (carbon dioxide and methane) that results in a net

in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Climate Models, PNAS, E5777-E5786, E5777
(2015).
8. Id. at E5779.
9. World Meteorological Organization, New Climate Predictions Increase Likelihood of
Temporarily Reaching 1.5 °C in Next 5 Years (May 27, 2021), available at
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/new-climate-predictions-increase-likelihood-oftemporarily-reaching-15-%C2%B0c-next-5.
10. Claire Stockwell et al., WARMING PROJECTIONS GLOBAL 1 (2021).
11. Id.
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reduction of greenhouse gases emitted to the atmosphere.”12 CCU
would change the treatment of carbon dioxide from being only a
pollutant to also a valuable raw material.13
CCU could contribute to addressing climate change in a number
of ways. CCU could help achieve mitigation goals by capturing carbon
dioxide from emissions sources that would otherwise be released into
the atmosphere.14 It could provide a substitute fuel to replace current
fossil fuels.15 CCU could contribute to goals for reducing carbon
emissions.16 It could also help to decarbonize certain sectors that
otherwise would be difficult to decarbonize.17 In addition, the
development of new markets relating to CCU could accelerate the
development of the carbon capture industry generally.18 Finally, CCU
could be important to keep the costs of addressing climate change from
rising significantly higher.19
Current estimates project that CCU could significantly benefit
both mitigation efforts and the economy. Estimates of the amount of
carbon that CCU use could reach as high as 7 billion tons.20 This
constitutes 19% of current global carbon dioxide emissions, which
exceed 36 Gt.21 The market for these products is projected to reach

12.
National Academies of Sciences (NAS), Engineering, and Medicine, GASEOUS
CARBON WASTE STREAMS UTILIZATIONS: STATUS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 15 (2019).
13. F. R. Lucci et al., NEW CARBON ECONOMY CORPORATE ROUNDTABLE: CARBON
CONVERSION TO VALUABLE PRODCUTS 4 (2019).
14.
CO2 SCIENCES AND THE GLOBAL CO2 INITIATIVE (CO2 SCIENCES), GLOBAL
ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTING CO2 UTLIZATION 10 (2016).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Jeffrey Bobeck et al., CARBON UTLIZATION – A VITAL AND EFFECTIVE PATHWAY
FOR DECARBONIZATION (2019).
18. Jessica Strefler et al., TOWARDS NET ZERO — CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND
UTILIZATION (2019). Such sectors include agriculture, aviation, food production, and marine
transportation. Mark Workman et al., An Assessment of Options for CO2 Removal from the
Atmosphere, ENERGY PROCEDIA 4 (2011) 2877–2884, 2877.
19. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 1. For instance, researchers anticipate that the costs of fully
decarbonizing the electric sector increase sharply after the reduction of 90% of emissions without
incorporating carbon sequestration. John E. T. Bistline & Geoffrey J. Blanford, Impact of Carbon
Dioxide Removal Technologies on Deep Decarbonization of the Electric Power Sector, NATURE
COMMUNICATIONS 9 (2021). Overall, studies consistently project that reducing emissions
sufficiently to avoid a 2°C rise in temperatures could cost two to three times more without large
scale carbon sequestration. Myles Allen et al., Certificates for CCS at Reduced Public Cost:
Securing the UK's Energy and Climate Future, ENERGY BILL 2015 2 (2015).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Global CO2 Emissions Have Been Flat for a Decade, New Data Reveals, CARBONBRIEF
(November 4, 2021), https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-co2-emissions-have-been-flat-for-adecade-new-data-reveals.
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$800 billion by 2030.22
2. CCU Opportunities
A key benefit of developing CCU is that it will help reduce the
cost of carbon capture technologies. The high cost of carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS) has slowed its deployment.23 Concern over
the high costs of CCS has raised interest in pursuing CCU.24 Demand
for carbon dioxide acquired through carbon capture could create
market pull, which would lead to the scaling up of carbon capture
technology and a concomitant reduction in its costs.25 Scientists
anticipate that increasing CCU will help to overcome current
reluctance regarding CCS, including its cost and public acceptance.26
Furthermore, utilization of the captured carbon might make carbon
capture financially viable.27
3. Possible CCU Products
Scientists anticipate that carbon can provide the basis for
numerous existing or novel products. Carbon is a relatively benign
material that can be incorporated into a wide range of products.28
However, it is also thermodynamically highly stable, so its conversion
into such materials will be energy intensive.29 As a result, a number of
22. NAS, supra note 12, at 21.
23. Ahmed Al-Mamoori et al., Carbon Capture and Utilization Update, ENERGY TECHNOL.
2017, 5, 1–17, 1. Analysis by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has shown the importance of CCS. 101 out of 166 of its integrated assessment models (out of a
total of 900) that showed a likelihood of keeping warming under 2°C by 2100 required some form
of carbon dioxide removal to remain under this level of warming. Christopher B. Field &
Katharine J. Mach, Rightsizing Carbon Dioxide Removal, 356 SCIENCE 706, 707 (2017).
24. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 4.
25. David Roberts, Pulling CO2 out of the Air and Using It Could Be a Trillion-Dollar
Business,
VOX,
Nov
22,
2019,
available
at
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/9/4/20829431/climate-change-carbon-capture-utilization-sequestration-ccuccs.
26. Al-Mamoori, supra note 23, at 8.
27. Krysta Biniek et al., Why Commercial Use Could Be the Future of Carbon Capture
(January 12, 2018), available at https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/ourinsights/why-commercial-use-could-be-the-future-of-carbon-capture.
28. Niall Mac Dowell et al., The Role of CO2 Capture and Utilization in Mitigating Climate
Change, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, Vol. 7, 243–49, 244 (Apr. 2017).
29. Rosa M. Cuéllar-Franca & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon Capture, Storage and Utilisation

Chavez final macro (Do Not Delete)

6

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

3/24/2022 1:53 PM

[Vol. XXXII:1

issues require addressing before CCU can reach its potential.
Carbon dioxide fixation in products will vary substantially.30 The
first systematic review of potential CCU opportunities concluded that
the usage and lifetime of CCU products falls into three categories.
First, inclusion in synthetic fuels provides short-term storage. Second,
usage in plastics or polymers would provide medium-term storage.
Finally, inclusion in building materials would provide long-term
storage.31
Thus, when evaluating CCU options and their
incentivization, policymakers must identify both the amount of carbon
that they will fix and the period over which the carbon will be removed
from the atmosphere.32 A shorter period of fixation is not necessarily
disqualifying, but it necessitates that the products’ use be repeated very
often.33
Researchers have identified ten different CO2 utilization
pathways.34 They organize these specific pathways into three
categories, two of which are relevant here.35 First, “cycling” pathways
include those utilization techniques that pass carbon through industrial
systems in brief timescales, such as days, weeks, or months. Prominent
in this group are CO2-based fuels and chemicals.36 Alternatively,
“closed” pathways store carbon nearly permanently. Included among
Technologies: A Critical Analysis and Comparison of Their Life Cycle Environmental Impacts, J.
CO2 UTILIZATION 9 (2015) 82–102, 86.
30. Peter Markewitz et al., Worldwide Innovations in the Development of Carbon Capture
Technologies and the Utilization of CO2, ENERGY ENV’T SCI. (2012), 5, 7281–7305, 7282–83.
31. Strefler et al., supra note 18, at 10. Conversely, scientists project that CCS will provide
nearly permanent sequestration of carbon, trapping it for centuries. Juan Alcalde et al.,
Estimating Geological CO2 Storage Security to Deliver On Climate Mitigation, NATURE
COMMC’N 1 (2018).
32. Strefler et al., supra note 18, at 10.
33. Markewitz et al., supra note 30, at 7283.
34. Cameron Hepburn et al., The Technological And Economic Prospects For CO2
Utilization And Removal, NATURE, Vol 575, 7 November 2019, 87–97, 87. This analysis identifies
the following ten pathways:
(1) CO2-based chemical products, including polymers; (2) CO2-based fuels; (3)
microalgae fuels and other microalgae products; (4) concrete building materials; (5)
CO2 enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR); (6) bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
(BECCS); (7) enhanced weathering; (8) forestry techniques, including
afforestation/reforestation, forest management and wood products; (9) land
management via soil carbon sequestration techniques; and (10) biochar. Id.
35. The third category includes “open” pathways, which typically involve biological systems
that can remove and store substantial quantities of carbon in “leaky” natural systems that could
experience large-scale flux of carbon back into the atmosphere. Id. at 87–88.
36. Id. at 87. The source of the carbon will impact the sequestration effect of CCU fuels.
Synthentic fuels that reuse carbon of fossil origin can at best halve emissions; carbon captured
from the atmosphere can close the carbon cycle and become carbon neutral. Strefler et al., supra
note 18, at 10.

Chavez final macro (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2021]

TURNING CARBON INTO GOLD

3/24/2022 1:53 PM

7

these pathways are enhanced oil recovery,37 enhanced weathering,38
and inclusion in the built environment.39 Both open and closed
pathways may be economically viable without substantial shifts in
prices.40 Eventually, all pathways need to become closed to achieve net
zero emissions. To become closed, the CO2 will need to be sourced
from the atmosphere, through some form of carbon capture.41
Another analysis of CCU opportunities identified six markets or
product clusters. It categorized these clusters by the number of active
developers, technology pathways, and end products. These categories
are algae (as a biofuel or food product), building materials (conversion
to carbonates or infusion into materials), chemical intermediates
(methanol and syngas), fuels (methane production), novel materials
(carbon fibers), and polymers (polycarbonates).42
The following discussion surveys several of the more promising
applications of CCU. It addresses their potential, both in carbon
sequestration and economic return.
a. Building Materials
A number of common materials in this category include cement,
concrete, paving asphalt, and aggregates.43 Their total market value is

37. Enhanced oil recovery involves injection of a substance, often CO2, into a reservoir to
repressurize and release any oil or gas that may be trapped in the formation. The injected CO2
releases the oil or gas, which becomes combined with the CO2 and can then be pumped out. The
CO2 can be separated and re-injected to repeat the process. Al-Mamoori, supra note 23, at 8.
Currently, enhanced CO2 oil recovery accounts for approximately 4 to 15% of additional oil
production. National Energy Technology Laboratory, CARBON DIOXIDE ENCHANCED OIL
RECOVERY 14 (2010). Technological improvements, however, could increase the amount of
recovered oil to 22% or even as high as 60%. Id.
38. Atmospheric CO2 naturally forms a chemical bond with reactive minerals. NATIONAL
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECH. AND
RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION: A RES. AGENDA 39 (2019). Enhanced weathering augments this
natural weathering process. It involves mining and grinding particular minerals to small grain sizes
to increase their surface area exposed for weathering. Jessica Strefler et al., Potential and Costs
of Carbon Dioxide Removal by Enhanced Weathering of Rocks, 13 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1, 1
(2018).
39. Hepburn et al., supra note 34, at 87. This is discussed more fully in the next section.
40. Id. at 95.
41. Id. at 90.
42. CO2 Sciences, supra note 14, at 12.
43. Rory Jacobson & Matt Lucas, A REVIEW OF GLOBAL AND U.S. TOTAL AVAILABLE
MARKETS FOR CARBONTECH 4 (undated).
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approximately $100 billion domestically and $1.4 trillion globally.44
The manufacturing of construction materials generates 11% of CO2
emissions.45 Indeed, if the cement industry were a separate country, it
would rank third among CO2 emitters behind only China and the
United States.46
Concrete is the most used human-made material.47 Importantly,
concrete use is measured in gigatons, the same unit used to measure
annual CO2 emissions.48 Thus, unlike other potential CCU products,
concrete is used at a scale commensurate to the magnitude at which
society releases CO2 into the atmosphere. Accordingly, CCU concrete
could make a significant contribution to carbon reduction.
Concrete is a blend of several materials, including cement,
water, and aggregates.49 When water activates cement, it binds the
aggregates into a rigid mix.50 Cement has a substantial carbon
footprint.51 Cement manufacturing alone is responsible for 2 gigatons
of CO252 and 5.6% of global CO2 emissions.53 The manufacturing
process releases CO2 through energy use and calcination reactions.54
Replacing water with CO2 during the mixing process enhances the
strength of concrete, allowing for the use of less cement. This reduces
the carbon intensity of concrete.55 Such “carbon curing” can produce
44. Id.
45. Jay H. Arehart et al., On the Theoretical Carbon Storage and Carbon Sequestration
Potential of Hempcrete, J. CLEANER PROD. 266 (2020) 121846, 1.
46.
Stephen Lee, Concrete Still a Barrier to Climate-Friendly Infrastructure Plan,
BLOOMBERG LAW ENVIROMENT & ENERGY REPORT NEWSLETTER (May 25, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/5J4A-KTYQ.
47. Jacob Schneider, Decarbonizing Construction through Carbonation, PNAS (June 9,
2020), vol. 117, no. 23, 12515–17, 12517.
48. Id.
49. David Roberts, These Uses of CO2 Could Cut Emissions — and Make Trillions of
Dollars (These Uses), VOX, Nov 27, 2019, available at https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/11/13/20839531/climate-change-industry-co2-carbon-capture-utilizationstorage-ccu.
50. Id.
51. Julia Rosen, Turning Carbon into Concrete Could Win UCLA Team a Climate Victory
— and $7.5 Million, LOS ANGELES TIMES (January 16, 2020), available at
https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2020-01-16/ucla-xprize-team-turning-carbon-intoconcrete.
52. Ajay Gambhira et al., Energy System Changes in 1.5°C, Well Below 2°C and 2°C
Scenarios, ENERGY STRATEGY REVIEWS 23 (2019) 69–80, 78.
53. Jeffrey Rissman, CEMENT’S ROLE IN A CARBON-NEUTRAL FUTURE 1 (2018).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Rissman, supra note 53, at 11. Cement is the primary contributor to the CO2 content
of concrete. The contribution of other ingredients is essentially “the noise” compared to the share
added by cement. Schneider, supra note 47, at 12516.
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concrete that is 4% CO2.56 Benefits of curing include shortening curing
times, increasing concrete’s water resistance, and strengthening the
concrete.57 Using CO2 in the cement-making process is an example of
an essentially closed pathway since it could possibly store the carbon
for a century or longer.58
Cement already naturally sequesters some carbon through the
process of mineral carbonation. Mineral carbonation is a chemical
process in which CO2 reacts with a metal oxide to form carbonates.59
The process converts an organic, stable material, CO2, into an
inorganic, even more stable material, a carbonate.60 Specifically, CO2
can be added in the production of cement and aggregate to form
carbonates.61 Manufacturers use carbonates to produce construction
materials, such as concrete.62 These relatively stable carbonates,
importantly, can sequester CO2 for decades or centuries without risk
of leakage.63 Analyses have concluded that mineral carbonation could
reduce the global warming potential of the CO2 used for the process
from 4 to 48% when compared to its global warming impact without
capture.64 However, this technology is not ready for large-scale
implementation, and its costs are still too high.65 Furthermore, testing
and validation of new materials is also necessary.66

56. Biniek, supra note 27. CarbonCure Technologies, a Nova Scotia company, has begun
injecting liquid CO2 during the concrete mixing process. The process can reduce concrete’s
carbon content by 5-7%. Jane Margolies, Concrete, a Centuries-Old Material, Gets a New Recipe,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(August
11,
2020),
available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/business/concrete-cement-manufacturing-greenemissions.html?action=click&module=Editors%20Picks&pgtype=Homepage.
57. Biniek, supra note 27.
58. Roberts, These Uses, supra note 49.
59. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29, at 86.
60. NAS, supra note 12, at 21.
61. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 9.
62. NAS, supra note 12, at 21.
63. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29, at 87. By contrast, scientists recognize that
underground storage of CO2 will inevitably result in a certain amount of leakage. Estimating
over a 10,000 year period, they project that from 2% to 6% of the injected CO2 will leak from
regulated storage, but as much as 22% to 33% of CO2 will leak from unregulated storage.
Alcalde, supra note 31, at 9.
64. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29, at 92. The wide range in the estimates
resulted because the three calculations that provide the basis for the analysis relied upon different
methods for the carbonation. Id.
65. Id. at 87. Low-carbon gravel aggregate currently would sell for $70-100 per ton, whereas
typical aggregate can sell for as low as $50 per ton. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 11.
66. NAS, supra note 12, at 21–23. New or developing technologies may provide additional
means to utilize CO2 in the manufacture of construction materials. The company CO2 Concrete,
LLC, for instance, has developed a process to replace cement with binding agents that absorb and
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Thus, building materials satisfy the most important requirements
for effective CCU development – use at the scale of billions of tons and
long-term sequestration.67 Moreover, among CCU opportunities, they
have the greatest potential for utilizing large quantities of CO2 in the
near term.68 Total global emissions reductions potential from
construction materials could reach as high as 1 billion to 10 billion tons
by 2030.69 Furthermore, analysts project the demand for concrete to
skyrocket during this century as population shifts stimulate the
building of cities.70
b. Synthetic Fuels
Technically, manufacturers can convert carbon dioxide into any
type of fuel derived from petroleum.71 Already, manufacturers produce
a number of synthetic fuels. These are liquid fuels that producers
derive from coal, natural gas, and biomass feedstocks through chemical
conversion processes.72 Similarly, treating CO2 with a reducing agent
can yield many fuels, including methane, methanol, and formic acid.73
Importantly, utilization of CO2 to produce synthetic fuels will
not sequester carbon for long periods;74 instead, their chief benefit
results from replacing traditional fuels with low-carbon fuels.75 Use of
synthetic fuels can be especially critical to reduce emissions from
mineralize CO2. Roberts, These Uses, supra note 49. The enterprise Low Emissions Intensity
Lime & Cement is developing a process that seeks to produce a purified CO2 stream from the
production process for cement and lime which can then be sequestered or reused. Id.
67. NAS, supra note 12, at 219.
68. Id.
69. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 9.
70. Rosen, supra note 51. Specifically, projections estimate that global urbanization and
population growth will require the construction of 230 billion m3 of new buildings by 2060.
Francesco Pomponi et al., Buildings as a Global Carbon Sink? A Reality Check on Feasibility
Limits, ONE EARTH 3, 157–61, 157 (August 21, 2020). For an example of the potential impact
these structures could have, if builders used CCU processes in the construction of the Salesforce
Tower in San Francisco, which required nearly 100,000 yd3 of concrete, that single building
structure could have reduced atmospheric carbon by more than 100.5 million pounds of CO2.
Schneider, supra note 47, at 12517.
71. Biniek, supra note 27.
72. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 7.
73. Samaresh Chandra Sau et al., Transforming Atmospheric CO2 into Alternative Fuels: a
Metal-Free Approach under Ambient Conditions, CHEM. SCI. (2019) 10, 1879 –84, 1879.
74. Mac Dowell et al., supra note 28, at 247 (noting that CO2 conversion to methanol will
not store CO2 for a significant period).
75. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 15.
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otherwise hard to decarbonize sectors, such as aviation and marine
transportation.76 The development of low-carbon fuels would be
particularly helpful because they provide a means to reduce emissions
in these sectors while operating within the current infrastructure.77
Scientists consider the conversion of CO2 into synthetic fuels to be
the most promising CCU pathway.78 Nevertheless, projections of its
ultimate impact varies dramatically. For instance, projected CO2
utilization in fuels range from 1 to 4.2 GtCO2 per year.79 The domestic
and global markets for these fuels can reach $900 billion and $3.8
trillion, respectively.80
Despite the promise of this pathway, several hurdles remain.
Besides advances in chemistry, development of these fuels will
necessitate advances in process and reaction engineering and in novel
process design.81 In addition, the costs of conversion of CO2 into
synthetic fuels remains high, necessitating policy support.82
Furthermore, because of the high capital costs involved in fuel
development and processing, this pathway (and algae, infra at Section
I.B.3.e.) will benefit from economies of scale and learning by doing,
which inevitably result from increased production.83
76. Id. at 16. The chemical conversion of CO2 to synthetic fuels will require energy, which
will need to be low carbon or renewable to achieve decarbonization through the substitution of
the fuels. Id. at 14.
77. Hepburn et al., supra note 34, at 91.
78. Al-Mamoori, supra note 23, at 9. Projections estimate that derived fuels may have both
a larger market potential and larger emission reduction effect than many other possible uses, such
as chemicals and polymers. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 11. Low-carbon fuel mandates will help
drive this potential. CO2 Sciences, supra note 14, at 15. California’s low-carbon fuel standard
(LCFS) regulates a fuel’s “life-cycle” emissions. These include CO2 emissions resulting from fuel
production, including extracting and refining the fuel, as well as emissions related to the finished
fuel’s transportation to market. James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1369, n.71 (2014). Alternatively, five states (Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washington) have enacted alternative fuel standards (AFS), which
require that a specific percentage of fuels derive from alternative fuels, such as cellulosic and
noncellulosic ethanol and biodiesel. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Low Carbon and
Alternative
Fuel
Standard,
last
visited
February
26,
2021,
available
at
https://www.c2es.org/document/low-carbon-fuel-standard/. Oregon has enacted both an LCFS
and an AFS. Id.
79. Hepburn et al., supra note 34, at 91.
80. Jacobson & Lucas, supra note 43, at 4.
81. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 14.
82. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 11.
83. Hepburn et al., supra note 34, at 91. “Economies of scale” result as production costs
per unit of output fall as fixed costs get spread over an increasing volume of production. Rising
production volumes also enable efficiencies through greater divisions of labor. Saed Alizamir et
al., Efficient Feed-In-Tariff Policies for Renewable, 64 OPERATIONS RES. 52, 53 (2016). “Learning
by doing” refers to a concept recognized in economics that costs decline as production increases
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c. Chemicals and Other Manufactured Products
Another sector that might utilize captured CO2 is the chemical
industry. Manufacturers already use CO2 to develop chemicals and
plastics.84 They can also use CO2 to produce a range of chemical
intermediates (feedstocks for industrial processes) and polymers
(precursors for plastics, adhesives, and pharmaceuticals).85 However,
as with fuels, utilization in chemicals stores CO2 only until the chemical
is used, though storage in polymers can last for several decades.86
Moreover, for CCU purposes, the domestic chemical market is
minimal when compared to other CCU options.87 While the market
for plastics may be potentially substantial, derived polymers are
expensive and will require additional research and policy support.88
d. Algae
Another area for CO2 use involves algae. Algae can convert
sunlight and CO2 into marketable products, including chemicals, foods,
and fuels.89 A number of potential algae products may arise in the near
term, including biofertilizers and aquaculture.90 Algae-derived protein
also can provide dietary protein for both humans and animals.91 Other
possible uses – as biofuels or bioplastics, for instance – still require
additional research and development to determine viability at scale
and to reduce costs.92
Unlike using CO2 to produce chemicals93 or to provide food
because manufacturers learn how to produce the item more efficiently. Id.
84. Biniek, supra note 27.
85. Roberts, These Uses, supra note 49.
86. Mac Dowell, supra note 28, at 246.
87. Jacobson & Lucas, supra note 43, at 4. Even at a global level, this market is only $20
billion. Id. At least one study projects that use of CO2 in the chemical industry could eventually
use up to 3.7 GtCO2 (approximately 10 percent of current emissions). Arne Kätelhön et al.,
Climate Change Mitigation Potential of Carbon Capture and Utilization in the Chemical Industry,
PNAS (June 4, 2019), vol. 116, no. 23, 11187–94, 11188. However, this projection relies upon the
further development of particular technologies which will still require “substantial research and
development efforts and novel production facilities.” Id.
88. Roberts, These Uses, supra note 49.
89. NAS, supra note 12, at 97.
90. Bobeck, supra note 17, at vi.
91. NAS, supra note 12, at 100.
92. Bobeck, supra note 17, at vi.
93. Markewitz et al., supra note 30, at 7282.
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products,94 an advantage of using it to support algae growth is that this
does not require high-purity CO2.95 Unfortunately, all current and
prospective technologies for conversion of CO2 by algae into fuels or
other products face technical challenges and limitations.96 Among
others, photosynethesis is especially inefficient at converting solar
energy into proteins, and capital and operations costs are higher than
for comparable sources.97 Finally, generating fuels, bioplastics, and
other products from algae require additional research to lower costs
and attain commercial viability.98
e. Other Uses
Scientists have identified a number of other possible uses for
captured carbon. The food and drink industries already use CO2 as a
carbonating agent, a preservative, a packaging gas, and as a solvent for
flavor extraction and decaffeination.99
In the metal industry,
manufacturers use CO2 for a number of uses, including chilling parts
for shrink fitting, hardening of moulds, and contributing to oxygen
furnace processes.100 Other industries that use CO2 include pulp and
paper processing, water treatment, and printed circuit board
manufacturing.101
The energy industry also could use CO2 in a number of ways. In
conventional generation, CO2 can replace steam in turbines to enable
generators to run more efficiently.102 CO2 requires less energy to
94. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29, at 86.
95. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 14. This assumes that the algae is grown in ponds, which do
not require high-purity CO2, but do require substantial areas of land. Cuéllar-Franca &
Azapagic, supra note 29, at 87. Alternatively, photo-bioreactors require less space, but do
necessitate the use of a purified CO2 stream. Al-Mamoori, Krishnamurthy, Rownaghi, & Rezaei,
supra note 23, at 10.
96. NAS, supra note 12, at 121.
97. Id. at 98.
98. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 14.
99. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29, at 86. One company currently hydrogenates
CO2 into pure ethanol, from which it produces “Green Vodka.” Geoffrey Ozin, Flying High on
Carbon Dioxide: Decarbonizing Aviation, ADVANCED SCIENCE NEWS (Jun 4, 2020), available at
https://www.advancedsciencenews.com/flying-high-on-carbon-dioxide-decarbonizing-aviation/.
A problem with using CO2 in food-related processes is that those uses typically require the CO2
streams to achieve purity levels of 99% or greater. Tryfonas Pieri et al., Holistic Assessment of
Carbon Capture and Utilization Value Chains, ENVIROMENTS 6 (2018).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Biniek, supra note 27.
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compress than steam does. Its use can thus increase the energyconversion rate from approximately 33% to as high as 49%.103 Finally,
the energy sector could also use renewable energy to covert CO2 into
low-carbon fuels.104 This could have two results. First, this could
constitute a form of long-term energy storage – fuel converted in the
summer using solar and wind power could provide energy in winter
months.105 Second, by increasing the effective capacity of wind and
solar, such storage capabilities could increase the installation of
renewable energy sources.106
4. Obstacles to Scaling Up CCU
Despite their possibilities, CCU technologies are not yet ready
to achieve their sequestration potential. Current projections estimate
that CCU can sequester approximately 10% of annual global CO2
emissions (a reduction of 3.6 gigatons of CO2) within the next several
decades.107 However, to achieve this target, we need to implement
CCU technologies at scale, which will require technological
development and supportive regulatory and market conditions.108
Even under the best of circumstances, CCU will sequester only a
fraction of the CO2 that CCS could remove from the atmosphere.109
All potential CCU sectors must overcome obstacles before they
are ready to provide products for commercial markets. Depending
upon the sector, remaining obstacles involve technology, cost, or
103. Id. The energy-conversion ratio refers to the amount of energy in fuel that is converted
into electricity. Id.
104. Jon Gertner, The Tiny Swiss Company That Thinks It Can Help Stop Climate Change,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019).
105. Id. Importantly, these fuels could provide both lower-cost and longer-life storage than
is possible with batteries. Id.
106. Oleksandr S. Bushuyev et al., What Should We Make with CO2 and How Can We Make
It?, JOULE 2, 1–8, 2 (May 16, 2018). A related approach would be to use captured carbon to
produce “blue,” or “decarbonized,” hydrogen from natural gas. Sonja van Renssen, The
Hydrogen Solution?, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, Vol. 10 (September 2020) 799–801, 800.
107. NAS, supra note 12, at 3.
108. Id. Furthermore, the source of the CO2 matters. Using more concentrated sources,
such as directly from an emissions source as opposed to from the ambient air, can increase the
global warming potential effect of CCU by 30-60%. Cuéllar-Franca & Azapagic, supra note 29,
at 97. The difference arises because the concentration of CO2 in the ambient air is 100 to 300
times lower than in the emissions from a gas- or coal-fired power plant. National Research
Council (NRC), CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE
SEQUESTRATION 68 (2015).
109. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 5.
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market acceptance.110 For instance, a fundamental need is the
development of catalysts that enable CO2 to be used to generate
products at the scale of megatons.111 Advancement is also necessary in
process systems.112 Furthermore, the identification, development, and
implementation of value chains between CO2 sources and utilizers will
require the study of each stage of the chain and assessment of the entire
system as a whole.113
Moreover, research is still required on a number of aspects of
CCU. For instance, fundamental research still needs to be conducted
concerning issues directly or indirectly related to the scaling up of
CCU. Such areas include the fundamental understanding of catalysis,
the inexpensive production of green hydrogen, and further reduction
of the costs of renewable energy to support the conversion of carbon
dioxide into usable products.114
Further research is also necessary to create the conditions
conducive to attracting businesses to enter into these new markets.115
Businesses typically do not invest in new products and markets when
fundamental scientific knowledge has not been developed.116
Accordingly, because many businesses are still waiting for significant
uncertainties to be resolved, they have not begun investing in early
stage CCU research and development.117

II.

INCENTIVIZING RESEARCH

In view of the need for additional R&D on so many aspects of
CCU, appropriate incentive structures need to be developed to
accelerate related research and innovation. Typically, the government
110. Bobeck, supra note 17, at vi.
111. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 13. Since CO2 is relatively stable, supra note 29
and accompanying text, nearly all applications of CO2 require catalysts to generate the necessary
reactions. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 12. Presently, only a limited number of catalyst
families exist for these processes. Id. at 13.
112. NAS, supra note 12, at 215. These include such processes as transporting mass scales
of carbon gases, integrating carbon utilization with carbon capture technologies, and managing
and recycling inputs. Id.
113. Pieri, supra note 99, at 11.
114. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 3.
115. Lucci, supra note 13, at 6.
116. Id at 10.
117. Id at 12. Policy support will also facilitate the securing of financing for related projects.
S.J. Friedmann et al., CAPTURING INVESTMENT: POLICY DESIGN TO FINANCE CCUS PROJECTS
IN THE U.S. POWER SECTOR 6 (2020).
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needs to intervene to ensure that the level of private investment in
R&D reaches the necessary level.118 Economists generally accept that
underinvestment in R&D occurs in the absence of government
encouragement.119 Of course, increasing R&D is correlated with
enhanced levels of innovation.120 Government intervention can often
be necessary to compensate for market conditions that lead private
entities to under-invest in particular areas.121 Government incentives
can take one of two forms – rewards for innovators’ efforts or
reductions in their costs.122 Implementation of such policies is critical
since the gap between investment and availability of commercial
processes and products is substantial.123
To encourage research and innovation in a particular field, the
government has historically turned to four mechanisms: patents,
prizes, grants, and tax credits. While these four policies have histories
of successfully incentivizing innovation through different paths, none
is superior in all contexts, and each has strengths that render it optimal
in particular circumstances.124 In this section, this paper will review
each. In the following section, it will consider how these four
approaches might best be used to encourage the development of CCU.

118. Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Refraining the Debate, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999, 1020 (2014).
119. Noam Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research & Development
Tax Benefits, 34 VA. TAX REV. 109, 114 (2014). Businesses do not invest sufficiently in R&D
because they do not usually capture the full value of their investments. Id. This is because R&D
investments tend to generate positive externalities in the form of knowledge “spill overs” to other
parties. The inability of investors to prevent these spillovers and to receive the full benefit of
their investments discourages them from investing more fully into R&D. Michael J. Graetz &
Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of
International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 349 (2013).
120. Jay Shambaugh et al., ELEVEN FACTS ABOUT INNOVATION AND PATENTS 3 (2017)
(noting that R&D investments correlate with increased generation of high-quality patent
submissions).
121. Gary Guenther, PATENT BOXES: A PRIMER i (May 1, 2017).
122. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. LAW REV. 303, 311 (2013).
123. Shambaugh, supra note 120, at 8.
124. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 309.
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A. Patents

1. Patent Basics
At its essence, the patent system promotes two objectives:
incentivizing research and development, and enabling the diffusion of
inventions.125
Historically, the patent system has substantially
influenced the rate and direction of research and innovation.126 The
United States awards patents to inventions that are new and useful and
are not obvious from prior patented inventions.127 The United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) grants patents for a 20-–year
period.128 The patent term applies a one-size-fits-all standard –
regardless of the nature of the invention, the patent lasts for only 20
years,129 though its effective life may be shorter.130
Patents include a right to exclude others from the use of their
patented invention or process.131 In exchange for their right to
exclusive use, the patent law requires patentholders to disclose their
inventions and the procedures for their use.132 Disclosure is the “quid
pro quo” of patentholders’ right to exclude others from their
125. Kristina M. L. Acrinée Lybecker, How to Promote Innovation: The Economics of
Incentives
IPWATCHDOG.COM
(July
21,
2014),
available
at
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/21/promote-innovation-the-economics-ofincentives/id=50428/.
126. B. Zorina Khan, Inventing Prizes: A Historical Perspective on Innovation Awards and
Technology Policy, BUSINESS HISTORY REV. 89 (Winter 2015): 631–660, 648. Notably, patents
are a central feature of the innovation policy of the United States, the global industrial leader. Id.
at 650.
127. Timothy J. Brennan et al., PRIZES OR PATENTS FOR TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT:
AN ASSESSMENT AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 17 (2011).
128. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 319–20. Once granted by the USPTO, a patent
is presumptively valid, and parties contesting its validity must satisfy a clear and convincing
standard. Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 451 (2016).
129. Lucas S. Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1185, 1240 (2015).
130. Matthew S. Clancy & GianCarlo Moschini, Incentives for Innovation: Patents, Prizes,
and Research Contracts, APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY (2013) volume 35,
number 2, 206-241, 209, doi:10.1093 / aepp / ppt012. The patent term is 20 years as calculated
from the date of filing. The USPTO, however, requires on average three years before it approves
the application. Consequently, the effective life of a patent averages 17 years. Osborn, Pearce,
& Haselhuhn, supra note 129, at 1240–41.
131. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 208.
132. Irwin I. Park, Extinguishing Exclusive Marketing Rights: Interpreting the Medical
Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP L. 183, 187 (2011).
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invention.133 Dissemination of patentable advancements is a key aspect
of the patent system.134 It enables other inventors to build upon
patented knowledge to develop their own innovations.135 In fact,
disclosure distinguishes the patent system from the other incentive
schemes.136
While patents have played a significant role in the development of
technologies generally,137 they have been especially effective in
stimulating innovation in particular industries.138 The incentivizing
effects of patents has varied by sector.139 As relevant here, the sectors
with the highest amount of patenting activity include chemicals and
machinery.140 Specifically, chemicals account for one-quarter of all
patent applications, and mechanical engineering accounts for onefifth.141
2. Patent Benefits
Patents provide two particular benefits: they compensate
innovators for their work, and they utilize markets to determine the
amount of compensation. As discussed above, the patent system
provides innovators with the right to exclude others from using their
inventions.142 Of course, inventors then have the option of employing
the inventions themselves or licensing them to interested parties.143
Inventors, effectively, receive monopolies to use their inventions
themselves or to license their use to others.144 This temporary

133. W. N. Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 524 (2014).
134.
Heidi Williams, Incentives, Prizes, and Innovation 7 (14 November 2010)
(unpublished).
135. Price II, supra note 133, at 524.
136. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 355–56.
137. Khan, supra note 126, at 648.
138. Lybecker, supra note 125.
139. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 214.
140. Annette Alstadsæter et al., Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location, and Local R&D,
ECONIMIC
POLICY,
Volume
33,
Issue
93,
January
2018,
131–177,
139
https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eix021.
141. Id. at 146.
142. Osborn, supra note 129, at 1240.
143. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 320.
144. Park, supra note 132, at 186. As one commentator points out, the monopoly is not
absolute – patent holders cannot block previous or new inventions. Daniel F. Spulber, Prices
Versus Prizes: Patents, Public Policy, and the Market for Inventions, Northwestern Law & Econ
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monopoly allows inventors to charge higher rates for the innovation,145
which enables them to recover their development costs or more, if the
invention is successful.146 Such monopoly rights provide powerful
incentives to researchers to innovate and disclose or market their
inventions.147
An aspect of the patent system that sets it apart from other
incentive schemes is its source of compensation for innovators.
Whereas other methods (prizes, tax credits, and grants) require the
government (ultimately, taxpayers) or private parties to fund the
incentive system,148 the patent system relies upon the actual customers
of the inventions to reward the inventors. The system empowers
patent holders to use monopoly pricing to raise the price to the
eventual consumer.149 In effect, patent licensing works akin to a sales
Since inventors’ compensation derives either from the
tax.150
willingness of consumers to pay more for the invention (or goods it can
produce) or of other innovators to pay for licenses, inventors’ rewards
are effectively determined by the market for their inventions.151 Not
only does monopoly pricing assure a more accurate value for inventors’
efforts, it also shifts the burden of the award to the actual consumers
of the invention.152 Relying upon the market to determine the value of
an invention is particularly appropriate where an invention is difficult
to value ex ante or by parties other than the inventors themselves.153
The dissemination mandate of the patent system provides
additional benefits. First, it assures that the advancement in
knowledge will be available to other potential innovators.154 Second, it
fosters efficiency since other innovators will not need to duplicate the

Research Paper No. 14–15 11 (2014).
145. Price II, supra note 133, at 524.
146. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 410. By relying upon the markets to compensate
inventors, patents differ from most other incentive mechanisms because the value of the incentive
is determined after the invention. Spulber, supra note 144, at 34. On the other hand, this does
allow the awards to innovators to increase if, over time, society increases its valuation of their
inventions. Id.
147. Gregory N. Mandel, Innovation Rewards: Towards Solving the Twin Market Failures
of Public Goods (Innovation Rewards), 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 303, 308 (2016).
148. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 348.
149. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve
Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011).
150. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 312.
151. Id. at 308.
152. Id. at 303.
153. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 226.
154. Id. at 211.
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original work.155 Finally, awareness of the successful innovation may
encourage other inventors to focus their efforts in this area.156
Historical analysis of patents also finds that they are more likely
than other incentive mechanisms, such as prizes, to yield high-value
inventions.157 High-value inventions or patents are those that can be
commercialized; are upstream, parent patents that give rise to
downstream, offspring patents; and are forward-cited.158 Thus, they are
high value because they lead to additional innovations and inventions.
Finally, the patent system also benefits from low administrative
costs. As previously discussed, the system shifts the burden of payment
of the innovator’s reward to the consumer.159 Moreover, the portion of
administrative costs borne by the government is also relatively small.
In large part, the administrative and enforcement costs of the system
are borne by private parties.160 The main governmental costs of the
system are those associated with maintaining the court systems for
patent challenges and enforcement, which by comparison, are minor.161
3. Problems with Patents
Despite the distinct benefits of the patent system, scholars have
identified a number of problems with it. The principle concern—
deadweight loss—results from one of its strengths, the right to
exclusion. Exclusion creates artificial scarcity.162 Deadweight loss
results as competitors, who could drive down prices, are restricted by
higher prices.163 Such monopoly pricing opportunites create market
distortions.164 This renders the patent system inefficient because it
results in reduced availability or production, resulting in artificially

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 11.
158. Jonathan H. Ashtor, Redefining “Valuable Patents”: Analysis of the Enforcement Value
of U.S. Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 497, 532 (2015).
159. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 303.
160. Id. at 364.
161. Id.
162. Roin, supra note 118, at 1008.
163. Id. at 1023. Of course, these artificially higher prices incentivize innovators. Ted
Sichelman, Patents, Prizes, and Property, 30 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 279, 284 (2017).
164. Alberto Galasso et al., A Theory of Grand Innovation Prizes 48 RSCH. POL’Y 343–62,
346 (2018).
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higher prices.165 Economists typically consider this deadweight loss
from monopoly pricing to exceed the costs of other incentive
systems.166 In some sectors—for example, pharmaceuticals—analysts
have found that monopoly power spawns a number of detrimental
effects, including high drug prices, inequitable allocation of medicines,
and the creation of follow-on drugs with little additional value.167
Several procedures are available to minimize deadweight loss.
A form of price discrimination, two-part pricing, is one such approach.
In this system, a consumer pays an initial fee for the right to acquire
units at no additional charge or at a set price.168 Examples of this
pricing scheme include Disneyland169 and Netflix or Amazon Prime.170
Similarly, a patent pool typically requires members of the pool to pay
a fee for free or discounted access to the patents included in the pool.171
However, two-part pricing does not completely solve the deadweight
issue.172 The initial fee causes a deadweight loss of its own. For
instance, the Disneyland entrance fee will price some potential visitors
out of the market. It does, however, allow those who do pay admission
to avoid the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.173
Another approach to address deadweight loss involves
governmental efforts to reduce the effects of deadweight losses. The
government could directly reduce deadweight by subsidizing purchases
of the invention or its products, or indirectly reduce it by providing tax
credits for such purchases.174 Alternatively, or in addition, the

165. Mandel, Innovation Rewards, supra note 147, at 309.
166. Roin, supra note 118, at 1026. In general, the other systems shift the costs of R&D to
the taxpayers (grants, prizes and tax credits are funded by the government). Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 122, at 303. Prizes also have significant administrative costs. Spulber, supra note 144,
at 9–10.
167. Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents - A Critique of the Medical Innovation
Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 26 (2007).
168. Roin, supra note 118, at 1047.
169. Disneyland charges an admission fee, and then park visitors can enjoy the park’s rides
at no additional cost. Id. at 1047–48.
170. Netflix and Amazon Prime charge a monthly fee for unlimited access to their inventory
of films and television shows. Id. at 1048.
171. Id. at 1048. For proposals to apply patent pools or commons to climate engineering
inventions, see Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of
Geoengineering Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9.12 (2015), and Jesse L.
Reynolds et al., Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property: Toward a Research
Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2017).
172. Roin, supra note 118, at 1048.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1051.
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government could also impose price controls on these items.175 Of
course, substantial price controls run the risk of reducing the patent
system’s primary incentive of monopoly pricing. Furthermore, these
mechanisms minimize the effect of market forces as incentives for
innovation.176
The ability to exclude under the patent system also may
discourage follow-on inventions.177 Despite the benefits of invention
disclosure, empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that the patent
system discourages subsequent innovations.178 Economists have found
that the restrictions of the patent system may impede both follow-on
research and subsequent innovations.179
Another strength of the patent system, reliance upon markets,
may also prove to be a shortcoming. Market valuation of patents is
beneficial only if the market is capable of recognizing the value of
innovations. However, consumers’ willingness to pay for an innovation
often does not reflect its true social value.180 This disconnection
between social value and market value often arises with innovations
whose value is primarily environmental.181

B. Prizes
One mechanism to incentivize research that is currently
undergoing a renaissance is prizes. Prizes were used extensively in
several high-profile circumstances in the 18th, 19th, and early part of
the 20th Centuries, but then patents became the incentive of choice. In
retrospect, many commentators criticized the effectiveness of earlier
prizes and proposed modifications that would enhance their
effectiveness. A recent array of prize awards has given new life to this
incentive mechanism.

175. Id. at 1052.
176. Id. at 1053.
177. Follow-on inventions are those that relate to previous innovations and discoveries and
are thus a part of a cumulative process. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 211.
178. Williams, supra note 134, at 7.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Roin, supra note 118, at 1029.
181. Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property
Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENTVTL. L. 51, 58 (2005).
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1. The Fundamentals of Prizes
A prize is a payment offered to an innovator who develops an
invention satisfying specified criteria.182 Typically, the organizer (a
government or private party) of the prize sets the amount and terms of
the award before prospective inventors have commenced investment
into their research; then, the prize goes to the inventor who successfully
met the criteria.183 Since prizes reward innovators for their efforts,
prizes often require innovators to place their inventions in the public
domain, thereby avoiding the deadweight loss of patents.184 Some
prizes, though, allow inventors to retain their intellectual property
rights.185
Prizes require clear, prespecified criteria.186 Prizes typically
reward either the person or team that first satisfies the criteria or
performs the best by a specified date.187 Nevertheless, prize organizers
may find that, as competitors begin working on their innovations,
issues not initially foreseen may arise. For instance, their work may
demonstrate that certain criteria may not be feasible or become
obsolete through technological innovation.188 As a result, prizes will
operate most smoothly if their organizers incorporate three
considerations into their structures – transparency,189 iteration,190 and
nested decision making.191

182. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, INTELL. PROP. 53 (2002).
183. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 402.
184. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 225. Government prizes, of course, have their
own deadweight loss resulting from the taxation required to finance them. Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 122, at 314.
185. For instance, in its COMPETES Act, the federal government allows inventors to
secure their patent rights. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 411. Similarly, grand innovation
prizes, such as those organized by the X Prize Foundation, also enable inventors to pursue their
patent rights. Galasso et al., supra note 164, at 343.
186. Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development
Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, HEALTH AFFIARS 308 (February 2015).
187. Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 10.
188. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 427.
189. Id. at 438. Transparency is necessary because of the dynamic nature of the innovation
process and the possibility that the organizers may need to revise the rules of the competition as
the knowledge of the objective develops. Id.
190. Iteration will ensure that the organizers routinely and systematically review and revisit
requirements in light of new information as the competition proceeds. Id. at 439.
191. With nested decision making, fundamental rules of the competition remain unchanged,
while secondary rules are susceptible to modification in light of subsequent developments. Id. at
440.
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When prize organizers have sufficient ex ante information about
the type of invention sought and its market value, then prizes have
certain advantages over other mechanisms used to incentivize
innovation.192 If prize organizers can estimate the innovations’ value
with some certainty, then prizes can provide the ex ante incentive of
patents without the ex post detriment of deadweight loss.193
Furthermore, the need to identify the particular invention makes them
especially well suited to incentivizing applied rather than basic
research.194
Some organizers award their prizes ex post. Organizers establish
these “blue sky” prizes ex post for inventions for which ex ante prizes
did not exist.195 These blue sky, or “innovation,” prizes reward
innovations that satisfy particular criteria.196 Having compensated
inventors for their development, innovation prizes typically then place
the innovation into the public domain, thereby avoiding the
deadweight loss associated with the patenting of the invention.197
2. Prizes through History
The use of prizes to incentivize innovation has a history dating
back for centuries. Indeed, they used to be the primary means to
incentivize innovative activity. They receded with the rise of the patent
system. Nevertheless, they have experienced a resurgence in recent
decades.
The English Parliament passed one of the earliest and most
prominent ex ante prizes in the Longitude Act of 1714.198 The bill
provided £20,000 for a means to determine longitude while at sea.199
At the time of the passage of the act, everyone assumed that the

192. Adler, supra note 149, at 17.
193. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 232.
194. Adler, supra note 149, at 17–18.
195. Id. at 13.
196. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 225.
197. Id.
198. Khan, supra note 126, at 635.
199. Dava Sobel, LONGITUDE 53 (1995). In a practice that future prizes would often follow,
the Longitude Act actually provided for three prizes with decreasing value, from £20,000, £15,000,
and £10,000. To receive the top prize, the submission needed to be able to determine longitude
accurately within one-half of a degree; the middle prize required accuracy only to two-thirds of a
degress; and the third prize only to one degree. Id.
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winning device would rely upon astronomical data.200 However, John
Harrison, a watchmaker, eventually won the prize by inventing a clock
that utilized an especially accurate measure of time to determine a
ship’s position at sea.201 Harrison, poor and uneducated, did not
actually receive his prize for 47 years.202 The Act established the Board
of Longitude, a prize committee consisting of scientists, naval officers,
and government officials, to disburse the prize funds.203 The Board
delayed awarding Harrison his prize while attempting to establish that
solutions premised upon astronomy were more accurate.204 He
eventually needed to seek redress from the King and Parliament to
receive a partial award.205
Despite this uneven experience, ex ante prizes flourished
throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries.206 Both the French and
English Royal Academies of Sciences offered numerous prizes.207
Many prominent names are associated with prizes, including James
Madison,208 Napoleon Bonaparte,209 and Charles Lindbergh.210
200. Adler, supra note 149, at 20.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Khan, supra note 126, at 635.
203. Sobel, supra note 199, at 54.
204. Among the tactics employed by the board to delay the awarding of the prize to
Harrison: the Board required a second oceanic trip, rather than the one identified in the
Longitude Act, to demonstrate the clock’s accuracy; the manufacture of two duplicates of the
successful device; and subjection to ten months of additional testing. Id. at 123–35.
205. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 182, at 72, n.2. When informed of the travails of
Harrison and his family, King George III is reported as having exclaimed, “These people have
been cruelly treated.” Sobel, supra note 199, at 147. Despite the intervention of the crown and
the legislature, Harrison technically never received the full prize to be provided pursuant to the
Longitude Act; instead, Parliament awarded a sum comparable to the amount due to him from
the Board. Id. at 149.
206. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 317. Ex post prizes date back even earlier, to
at least the 16th Century. Fiona Murray, Scott Stern, Georgina Campbell, & Alan MacCormack,
Grand Innovation Prizes: A Theoretical, Normative, and Empirical Evaluation, RESEARCH
POLICY 41 (2012) 1779–92, 1780.
207. Adler, supra note 149, at 21.
208. During the Constitutional Convention, Madison proposed the inclusion of a prize
system, which presumably lost out to the Intellectual Property Clause. Roin, supra note 118, at
1021.
209. Napoleon offered a prize of ₣12,000 (approximately $4.5 million in 2017) for a means
to preserve food (to help feed his army). In 1795, Nicholas Appert won the prize for a process of
sealing meat in glass containers, in a procedure that preceded current day canning procedures.
Carol Ann Rinzler, IS IT SAFE TO KISS MY CAT?: AND OTHER QUESTIONS YOU WERE AFRAID
TO ASK 29 (2017).
210. Lindbergh’s famous transatlantic flight responded to the 1919 Orteig Prize. Despite
the conventional wisdom at the time that the flight could only be made by a sizable crew in a
multi-engine plane, Lindbergh successfully flew solo in a single-engine plane. Adler, supra note
149, at 23–24.
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Nevertheless, interest in using the prize mechanism waned. The
French Academy, which was largely a model for societies in other
countries, suffered a number of contentious disputes concerning its
prizes.211 More generally, a number of issues came to characterize
prizes. The awarding of prizes seemed haphazard at best, appearing to
result from bias, institutional capture, lobbying, and marketing.212
Maybe even more damning, many of the most significant inventions of
this period did not result from the prize system.213
3. Recent Developments in Prizes
Despite the problems that vexed earlier prize organizers, prizes
have recently made a comeback. Starting in the 1990’s, philanthropists
and private parties established several prominent prizes.214 In this
century, the federal government also has begun to use prizes to
incentivize research.215 As a result, a number of both private and public
efforts have arisen in the past 25 years.
The 21st Century has witnessed the establishment of a number
of high profile and successful prizes. The X Prize Foundation has
established many of the most prominent prizes in the past quarter
century.216 The Foundation is a nonprofit organization dedicated to
developing grand innovation prizes that lead to radical breakthroughs
to benefit humanity.217 Grand innovation prizes typically offer large
211. Wei, supra note 167, at 29.
212. Khan, Inventing Prizes, supra note 126, at 659–60.
213. Id. at 660. Conversely, an analysis of prizes awarded by the Royal Agricultural Society
from 1839 to 1939 suggests that the awarding of prizes resulted in an increase in related patents.
Petra Moser & Tom Nicholas, Prizes, Publicity and Patents: Non-Monetary Awards as a
Mechanism to Encourage Innovation, J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 785, Vol. LXI (2013).
214. Adler, supra note 149, at 24.
215. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 317.
216. Besides the X Prize Foundation prizes, groups organized several other notewothy prize
competitions in the past two decades. For instance, in 2009, Netflix sponsored a $1 million prize.
Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 1. The award, which sought a better algorithm to recommend
content to its customers, attracted several thousand participants. Burstein & Murray, supra note
128, at 403. Another prize, organized by RSA Security, offered $250,000 for a development that
it could use to improve its encryption software. Adler, supra note 149, at 24. Recently, Elon
Musk announced a $100 million prize to be awarded for the best technology to capture
atmospheric carbon. Reuters Staff, Elon Musk to Offer $100 Million Prize for ‘Best’ Carbon
Capture Tech, REUTERS (January 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-muskcarbon-capture/elon-musk-to-offer-100-million-prize-for-best-carbon-capture-techidUSKBN29R024.
217. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 419.
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monetary awards for achieving predetermined performance
requirements.218 Of particular note, they usually do not bar prize
winners from securing patent rights.219
Three X prize competitions are particularly informative here:
the Ansari X Prize, the Progressive Insurance Automotive X Prize, and
the NRG COSIA Carbon X Prize. In 1996, the Foundation offered the
$10 million Ansari X Prize to the first nongovernmental entity to
successfully develop a spacecraft. The ship needed to be able to carry
three people 100 kilometers above the earth’s surface twice within two
weeks.220 Eight years later, the team that built SpaceShipOne
accomplished these objectives and received the award.221 All told, 26
teams participated in the international competition, collectively
investing $100 million into commercial space flight research.222 Thus,
the prize inspired ten times as much in R&D expenditures.
The X Prize Foundation subsequently established the
Progressive Insurance Automotive X Prize in 2006 to encourage the
development of a fuel-efficient car.223 This prize demonstrated a
number of issues that can arise with prizes. First, the ex ante
development of technical specifications to define the prize
requirements was particularly challenging.224 The requirements for a
successful prize needed to be clear enough for competitors to follow
yet flexible enough to adapt to technological developments.225 The
terms of the prize provided:
A ten million dollar cash purse will be awarded to the teams that win
a long-distance stage race for clean, production-capable vehicles that
exceed 100 miles-per-gallon energy equivalent.226

Despite the brevity of this description, it incorporates a number of
218. Galasso et al., supra note 164, at 343.
219.
Id. In particular, the X Prize Foundation disavows any interest in taking the
intellectual property of competitors. Murray, supra note 206, at 1787. Interestingly, this approach
diverges from traditional prize theory, which views prizes as an alternative to patents and a means
to avoid their deadweight loss. Id. Not surprisingly, analysis suggests that more robust results
occur when prizes allow winners to retain their patent rights. Galasso et al., supra note 164, at
351.
220. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 317.
221. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 403.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 419.
224. Galasso et al., supra note 164, at 345, n.4.
225. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 424.
226. Id. at 419.
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complicated concepts.
For example, “clean, production-ready”
indicates that submissions must satisfy vehicle safety standards, be
capable of manufacture at scale, and include the features typical in
modern cars.227 In addition, because of the dynamic nature of this field,
the Foundation realized that it might need to alter the rules to take into
account technological obsolescence or advancements rendering initial
pararmeters irrelevant.228 Third, the breadth and flexibility of the rules
became a source of contention because, as with rules for prizes from
preceding centuries, flexible rules led to inconsistent applications and
lobbying.229
Beyond these issues, the Auto X Prize experience demonstrated
other complications that could arise during the pendency of the prize.
For instance, the competition included a staging goal— a requirement
that competitors satisfy a particular requirement to continue in the
competition. The initial standard, however, proved to be too
technologically demanding and needed to be revised.230 Another
unforeseen issue involved a divergence in designs, which required the
organizers to divide the competition into classes.231
The NRG COSIA Carbon X Prize is offering $20 million for
breakthrough technologies to convert carbon dioxide emissions into
usable products.232 The utility NRG and Canada’s Oil Sands
Innovation Alliance (COSIA) are funding the prize.233 The prize seeks
to accelerate the development of carbon utilization technologies.234
Criteria include the amount of carbon converted into products and the
net value of those products.235 The organizers will divide $20 million in
prize funds into $5 million in milestone prizes and $15 million in grand
prizes.236
In the past two decades, the United States government also
227. Id. at 419–20. The organizers included this last requirement because they realized that,
in prior competitions for hyper-efficient cars, the submissions often looked like “rolling coffins.”
Murray, supra note 206, at 1785.
228. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 427–28.
229. Id. at 430–31.
230. Id. at 434.
231. Id.
232.
X Prize Foundation, Turning CO₂ Into Products, available at
https://www.xprize.org/prizes/carbon, last visited July 17, 2020.
233. Bobeck, Peace, Ahmad, & Munson, supra note 17, at 3.
234. NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, and MED., GASEOUS CARBON
WASTE STREAMS UTILIZATION: STATUS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 202 (2019).
235. Id. Other criteria include the amount of freshwater and land necessitated by their
manufacture. Id.
236. Id. at 226.
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began using prizes to encourage innovation.237
The National
Academies of Sciences (NAS) urged the United States in 1999 to utilize
prizes to encourage technological innovations.238 In 2004, the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) offered a $1 million
prize for an autonomous land vehicle that could satisfy particular
requirements, and in 2006 NASA announced three prize
competitions.239 By 2009, NASA and the Departments of Defense and
of Energy had established combined prizes exceeding $35 million.240 In
that year, the Office of Management and Budget encouraged all
federal agencies to use prizes to support technological innovation.241
Congress also began supporting prizes. The Energy Policy Act of
2005 authorized the National Science Foundation to establish cash
prizes of up to $10 million for breakthrough energy technologies.242 The
next year Congress approved legislation to require the National
Science Foundation to establish a series of prizes to encourage
technological innovation.243 These developments set the groundwork
for the 2010 America COMPETES (Creating Opportunities to
Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and
Science) Reauthorization Act.244 The COMPETES Act authorizes all
federal agencies to award prizes to stimulate innovation that may
further the mission of the agency.245 It also identifies a number of
criteria that each prize must include.246 Between 2010 and 2020, federal
agencies have conducted nearly 1,000 prize contests, and the total
amount offered by the prizes rose from fiscal years 2011 to 2018 from
$247,000 to $37 million.247
Congress has also considered a bill to use prizes to support carbon
capture development. The USE IT (Utilizing Significant Emissions
237. A long-standing provision mandating prizes for innovations has applied to atomic
energy inventions. For national security reasons, individuals who develop inventions in this field
may not receive patents, so Congress enabled the Patent Compensation Board to choose to award
them a prize reward. Mandel, Innovation Rewards, supra note 147, at 317.
238. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 317.
239. Murray, Stern, Campbell, & MacCormack, supra note 206, at 1781.
240. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 317–18.
241. Murray, Stern, Campbell, & MacCormack, supra note 206, at 1781.
242. Adler, supra note 149, at 26.
243. Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 2.
244. Spulber, supra note 144, at 2, n.4.
245. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 404.
246. Spulber, supra note 144, at 2, n.4. Included with certain basic requirements (subject,
eligibility rules, and prize amount) is the delineation of the basis for selecting winning
submissions. Id.
247. Marcy E. Gallo, FED. PRIZE COMPETITIONS i (2020).
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with Innovative Technologies) Act was reintroduced in Congress in
2019.248 The bill supports research on carbon utilization and direct air
capture and facilitates their permitting and development.249 It also
directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Department of Energy to establish a program of financial prizes for
direct air capture technologies.250 It conditions the receiving of any such
award upon the vesting in the United States of any intellectual
property.251 The USE IT Act does not mandate (or even mention) an
awards program for carbon utilization. Instead, it requires EPA and
DOE to initiate a carbon utilization R&D program and to support it
by providing technical and financial assistance, though it does not
specify the particular type or amount of financial assistance.252 The
Senate did not act on the USE IT Act bill, but other, enacted bills
included several of its provisions.253
4. The Benefits of Prizes
Analysts have identified a number of benefits that prizes have
over other incentive systems, especially patents. A primary advantage
is that prizes can encourage researching technologies that markets do
not value sufficiently.254 Markets fail to encourage the development of
technologies whose market prices do not reflect their value.255 Prizes
(and grants) “reward innovations that ‘are publicly valued but not
privately marketable.’”256 A government prize, for instance, is
essentially a government intervention into the markets where they
have failed to sufficiently incentivize a public good.257 Prizes are also
248.
Senators Reintroduce USE IT Act to Promote Carbon Capture Research and
Development, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS (February 7, 2019), available at
https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases-republican?ID=A6871F9E-F13B48E4-82A0-74D983B6902D.
249. H. R. 1166 at 1 (2019). The bill defines “direct air capture” as a technology or system
that a facility uses to capture carbon dioxide directly from the air. Id. at Sec. 101(6)(B)(i)(III)(aa).
250. Id. at Sec. 101(6)(B)(ii)(I).
251. Id. at Sec. 101(6)(B)(iv)(I).
252. Id. at Sec. 101(6)(C)(iii)-(iv).
253.
Govtrack, S. 383 (116th): USE IT Act, last visited July 30, 2021, available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s383.
254. A similar advantage is that prizes can reward innovations that are not patentable.
Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 27.
255. Id. at 447.
256. Adler, supra note 149, at 14. An advantage that prizes have over grants, however, is
that prizes reward success, while grants are not contingent upon results. Grabowski et al., supra
note 186, at 308.
257. Wei, supra note 167, at 27.
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well suited to encourage high-risk research on technologies that are
still at their earliest stages.258 Similarly, they might also be well suited
to encouraging research in circumstances where scientific opinion is
divided concerning the appropriate path to direct technological
development.259 In other words, prizes fit circumstances where goals
are clear, but the best paths to achieve them are less certain.260 A
number of competitions have demonstrated this pattern. Specifically,
the Longitude Bill, the Netflix Prize, and the Progressive Insurance
Automotive X Prize all involved identifiable goals where the means to
achieve them were uncertain.261 By establishing criteria that encourage
research in particular areas, prizes can offer ex ante incentives to
pursue a targeted objective.262 Finally, by setting criteria that suggest a
particular result, organizers can signal the importance of a particular
issue.263
Prizes also avoid the deadweight loss of patents.264 Unlike the X
Prize Foundation’s provisions, organizers of other prizes usually
require winners of traditional prizes to place their intellectual property
into the public domain.265 Consequently, if the proceeds from prizes
are comparable to the returns inventors would receive from patent
rights, then inventors receive fair compensation while the public gains
ready access to their inventions without incurring the deadweight loss
of monopoly patent rights.266 In programs like those of the X Prize
Foundation, which allow innovators to retain their patent rights, the
prizes augment the rewards of the patent system.267 This may be
especially helpful where markets do not price in the social value of
innovations because the prizes can help to close the gap between
investment cost and market compensation.268
Another advantage of prizes is that they often broaden the pool of
258. Williams, supra note 134, at 10.
259. Id. at 11.
260. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 415.
261.
Id. at 449–50. Also characteristic of these competitions, and an important
consideration that favors the use of the prize mechanism, was the fact that certain potential
innovators were identifiable, but other possible winners were not. Id.
262. Wei, supra note 167, at 27.
263. Id.
264. Another efficiency benefit of prizes – when compared to grants, which are discussed
next – is that prizes do not require researchers to prepare applications, comply with eligibility
requirements, or satisfy imposed restrictions or deadlines. Adler, supra note 149, at 14-15.
265. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 410.
266. Id.
267. Adler, supra note 149, at 15.
268. Id.
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prospective innovators. Prizes attract persons who might not otherwise
engage in commercial efforts269 or who might not otherwise have
pursued a particular field.270 The competitive nature of prizes may also
attract new parties interested in pursuing the awards.271 As with the
Longitude Act, prizes can attract parties who might normally not be
among the anticipated pool of prospective inventors.272 Also, by
broadening the range of participants in the competition, prizes bring
the advantages of diversification to the efforts, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the competition will generate solutions to the
problem.273 Prizes broaden the pool of participants in part because
they also bring attention to their subject matter.274
The publicity surrounding prizes appears to be a significant
advantage that they provide. Prizes can both generate interest in a
topic and add to the prestige of participants.275 Indeed, historical
analysis suggests that the publicity from prizes without cash awards can
encourage innovation.276 One result of publicity is that it attracts
additional inventors to the subject.277 Furthermore, prizes often signal
to other possible inventors the significance of innovation in a particular
area.278
Unlike patents, prizes do not impede – and can support – followon innovations. As discussed previously, the exclusive rights and
monopoly pricing of the patent system can deter follow-on
innovations.279 Empirical evidence indicating that patents deter such
innovations suggests that prizes would be more favorable to them.280
Similarly, assuming that large awards encourage substantial research
efforts for breakthrough inventions, organizers can use a series of
smaller prizes to encourage follow-on inventions.281
269. Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 14.
270. Moser & Nicholas, supra note 213, at 785.
271. Adler, supra note 149, at 16.
272. Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 308. Of course, Harrison’s invention of a solution
that satisfied the Longitude Act is the classic example of a person developing a solution – a
timepiece – that the organizers of the competition had not anticipated. See supra section II.B.2.
273. Adler, supra note 149, at 33.
274. Id. at 17.
275. Id.
276. Moser & Nicholas, supra note 213, at 785.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 786.
279. See supra nn.177–79 and accompanying text.
280. Williams, supra note 134, at 7–8.
281. Moser & Nicholas, supra note 213, at 786.
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5. The Drawbacks of Prizes
Despite the many advantages that prizes have over other
incentive mechanisms, they also raise some notable concerns. Of
course, a key draw of prizes is their cash awards. Determining this
amount, however, can be difficult.282 To accurately value awards, their
organizers require sufficient information to approximate inventions’
market and social value.283 In some instances, doing so requires the
prize organizers to have access to information relevant to the value of
inventions.
Often such data is not readily available,284 and
governmental and nonprofit organizers are especially unlikely to have
it.285 Organizers do not need perfect information, but they do need to
be able to estimate eventual consumption comparably to projections
by prospective competitors.286
The social value of an invention, especially relevant in the context
of CCU, is typically difficult to calculate. By its nature, social value is
difficult to estimate; it can be particularly difficult when a novel
invention or process is involved.287 Failing to price the award correctly
can create problems. If the organizers price awards too low, then they
will not incentivize sufficient innovation efforts; if they set the amounts
too high, then competitions risk duplication of efforts, possibly leading
to favoritism and other issues in the selection process.288
Unique pricing and efficiency issues arise with government
prizes. Although a primary argument in favor of prizes over patents is
the avoidance of intellectual property’s deadweight loss, the overall
reduction of deadweight loss may not be as large as the elimination of
monopoly pricing might suggest.289 Moreover, governments typically
fund their prizes through taxes, which can have their own deadweight
effects.290 In general, however, economists estimate the deadweight
282. Adler, supra note 149, at 18.
283. V.V. Chari et al., Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for
Innovations, J. ECON. THEORY 147 (2012) 781–801, 782.
284. Id.
285. Roin, supra note 118, at 1035.
286. Id. at 1038.
287. Id. at 1035.
288. Park, supra note 132, at 203.
289. Roin, supra note 118, at 1061–62.
290. Spulber, supra note 144, at 9–10. These deadweight effects include the impacts from
sales or income taxes. The resulting higher prices may cause some potential consumers to leave
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loss from monopoly pricing to be worse.291
As suggested previously, prizes’ criteria and their application
can cause problems. Prizes function the smoothest when organizers
can identify a specific problem and can define their criteria for
satisfying the competition clearly.292 To many, the “primary lesson”
from the Longitude competition was that the ambiguities in the
competition criteria led to the difficulties Harrison encountered in
receiving his award.293 Criteria must be clear and minimize subjectivity,
yet be flexible.294 Of course, all of this must be done in the context of
technological development, which could render certain criteria
obsolete or irrelevant.295 As with the Longitude Act experience, prizes
with unclear criteria can generate unwanted controversy.296 The
Longitude experience also suggests that a clear enforcement procedure
may be necessary to resolve disputes timely.297
From an economics perspective, prizes can be inefficient. The
broad participation that they stimulate can be a detriment. Essentially,
prizes encourage multiple parties to work towards the same
innovation.298 Furthermore, collective resources expended in the
pursuit of prize awards can exceed their values.299 Conversely, the
patent system enables sequential development, as disclosure provides
follow-on inventors with access to the results of others’ work. Then,
they can work around these innovations or direct their efforts to new
inventions.300
A significant commonality between prizes and patents is that
both systems provide no financial support for innovators during their
research and development work. This can be especially problematic

the market. Roin, supra note 118, at 1026.
291. Roin, supra note 118, at 1026.
292. Mandel, Innovation Rewards, supra note 147, at 321. This suggests that prizes may not
be well suited for problems that are not easily defined and necessitate basic research. Adler,
supra note 149, at 35. One analysis concluded that prizes could still be used in such circumstances,
but they should follow the grand innovation prize model (such as the X Prize competitions) – the
winners of the prize awards retain their intellectual property rights. Galasso et al., supra note
164, at 351.
293. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 413–14.
294. Id. at 424.
295. Id. at 427.
296. Adler, supra note 149, at 18.
297. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 182, at 72, n.2.
298. Park, supra note 132, at 204.
299. Adler, supra note 149, at 16. This is another perspective on the $100 million total spent
by 26 parties in the hope of winning the $10 million Ansari X Prize. See supra at Section II.B.3.
300. Park, supra note 132, at 204.
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for researchers who do not have the resources to self-fund or whose
work requires costly equipment or materials.301

C. Grants

1. The Basics of Grants
Another tool to incentivize research and development is grants.
Indeed, the federal government provides most of its financial support
for research actvitiy in the form of grants.302 Government grants
provide a substitute for private funding of research.303 Essentially, they
shift the funding of research from private sources to public ones
(taxpayers).304
Government grants finance much of today’s basic research.305 This
is not surprising. Conceptual knowledge is not patentable, and the time
lag before its application renders it difficult for markets to value.306
Furthermore, since the results of basic research are uncertain,
disconnecting the link between results and compensation facilitates the
implementation of this work.307 Indeed, the receipt of grants is often
essential for certain research to proceed at all.308 Even in later stages,
grants can be the superior incentive mechanism. When the need for
basic research arises in later stages of applied research, grants still
excel. This research tends to be time consuming and distracting from
the primary task.309
Administering grants requires the government to acquire
sufficient information to make allocation decisions.310 Factors that
complicate decisionmaking include the inherent uncertainty of the
innovation process311 and information asymmetry.312 Governmental
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Adler, supra note 149, at 35.
Id. at 3.
Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 308.
Id.
Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 233.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 219.
Williams, supra note 134, at 11.
Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 308.
Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 432–33.
Id. at 435.
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agencies can overcome these concerns by utilizing both high-level
policymaking and peer review. Setting policy at upper levels of
agencies allows for the setting of priorities and political accountability;
peer review assures that members of the pertinent scientific
communities decide the awarding of grants.313
2. The Benefits of Grants
By providing financial support to conduct research, grants
effectively reduce the costs of this work.314 This is especially important
for certain researchers, including those who do not have sufficient
resources,315 do not have income that can be offset by tax credits,316 or
are conducting research that requires costly equipment or the
construction of demonstration projects.317
Furthermore, unlike
patents, which reward whatever inventions on which researchers
decided to expend effort, grants provide a means for the government
to direct research.318
In general, researchers and scientific societies prefer grants for
three reasons. First, government bureaucrats and researchers alike
find them easier to administer. Second, grants afford administrators
more discretion in awarding them.319 From the government’s
perspective, grants can be an effective means of directing and
generating research leads.320 Finally, for researchers, grants reduce
their costs and do not condition compensation upon the success of their
work.321
3. The Problems with Grants

313. Id. at 451–52.
314. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 311.
315. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 219 (noting that while the government intends
grants to cover the costs of research, they often provide part of researchers’ compensation, too).
316. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 337.
317. Adler, supra note 149, at 18.
318. Wei, supra note 167, at 45.
319. Adler, supra note 149, at 23.
320. Williams, supra note 134, at 10.
321. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 216.
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Despite the important role that grants play in innovation, they
are not without criticisms. One primary objection regards the process
for determining the parties who will receive the grants. The centralized
nature of awarding grants limits the range of prospective researchers
who might receive funding.322 This narrowing not only limits the
number of parties addressing particular topics, it also reduces the
likelihood that the grants will generate viable solutions.323
Furthermore, since grants are upfront payments, unlike with patents
and prizes, recipients do not – and cannot – assure that the sought
innovation will in fact be developed.324
Another related concern involves the selection process for
determining grant recipients. Government grants can be susceptible to
political pressure.325 Although grant programs can use peer-review
procedures, even expert panels can direct funds suboptimally.326
Regardless of the merits of selection processes, by their nature ex ante
grants will pick “winners” and “losers.”327 Even assuming that the
process is unbiased, successfully selecting the applicants most likely to
succeed can be difficult.328 Not surprisingly, government programs
have had limited success in selecting paths for future innovations.329
Government grants also have higher administrative costs than
most other incentive mechanisms. Typically, they must comply with
federal regulations and agency reporting requirements. These
restrictions discourage potential applicants by raising the temporal and
financial costs of applying.330 In some grant programs, the combined
administrative burden on the agency and applicants could reach as high
as one third of the total grant award.331

322. Adler, supra note 149, at 29.
323. Id.
324. Mandel, Innovation Rewards, supra note 147, at 320.
325. Adler, supra note 149, at 29.
326. Id. at 34.
327. Id. at 29.
328. Wei, supra note 167, at 45 (noting difficulties the government has encountered in
identifying research that can best improve health care or the best applicant to perform such work).
329. Adler, supra note 149, at 37.
330. Id. at 31.
331. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 362. Governmental grant programs also run
risks of influence or capture during the seletion process. Adler, supra note 149, at 34. These
programs often utilize peer-review panels or other mechanisms to avoid these issues. Id.
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D. Tax Policy

1. Incentivizing R&D through the Tax Code
The government also uses the tax code to encourage research.
The tax code contains two primary provisions pertaining to research
costs. First, Section 174 of the code allows taxpayers to treat research
expenditures as expenses (as opposed to capitalized investments).332
Alternatively, taxpayers can forgo the Section 174 deduction and
instead claim a 20% tax credit under Section 41.333 This section
provides a credit equivalent to the amount of research expenses
increased over a base amount.334 Congress did not make the credit
permanent until 2015. Until then, it set expiration periods for the
credit.335 This practice incurred the wrath of businesses because of the
resulting inability to plan their expenditures.336
State governments also use tax credits to incentivize research.337
In some instances, European countries have used more targeted tax
benefits. For instance, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary have
provided tax credits or deductions for salaries of researchers.338
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Using the Tax Code
Analyses of tax credits indicate that they have encouraged
taxpayers to spend more on research expenditures than they would
332. 26 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1). Expensing allows taxpayers/researchers to apply the research
expenses against current income. Otherwise, the Tax Code would require that taxpayers
capitalize expenditures incurred to create or improve assets with useful lives of more than one
year and then depreciate or amortize these expenditures over an extended period of time.
Stephen E. Shay et. al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX
L. REV. 419, 430 (2016).
333. Id. at 432.
334. 26 U.S.C. § 41(a). The credit limits its application to expenses that exceed the
taxpayers’ base amount of research expenditures to ensure that taxpayers receive the credit only
for increasing their research costs. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 324. Taxpayers can
apply a tax credit equal to 20% of their research expenditures. Id. The credit applies only to
some of the expenditures that can be expensed under Section 174. Id. at 323.
335. Shay, supra note 332, at 434. In fact, Congress allowed the credit to expire for a twelvemonth period extending from 1995 to 1996. Graetz, supra note 119, at 353, n.17.
336. Shay, supra note 332, at 434.
337. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 325.
338. Noked, supra note 119, at 145.
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have otherwise.339 Indeed, Congress designed the credits to produce
this particular result. The credits reward only research expenditures
that exceed a “base amount” of past research expenditures.340
Additionally, tax credits and deductions help to elicit information from
private actors regarding the expected value of R&D projects.341 Tax
provisions also avoid monopoly costs in markets.342
Commentators have criticized research tax provisions on several
grounds. A primary criticism is that conclusions about their
effectiveness have been unclear. Analyses of R&D tax incentives
produce a wide range of estimates of the effect of such incentives in
generating new R&D; they also question the cost effectiveness of such
an approach.343 Another concern regarding tax incentives is that they
actually only incentivize established entities that have taxable liability,
enabling them to make use of the tax deductions or credits.344 Other
entities, such as startups, often have no income against which to apply
their deductions or credits.345 Finally, other problems that hamper
government incentives apply here as well. Ex ante the government will
often be unsure of which innovations to incentivize or be unable to
value inventions accurately.346

III.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

Each of the four incentive systems can be the optimal approach
depending upon the particular set of circumstances involved.347 The
following section will explore more fully the circumstances which favor
particular incentives. Then, this article will consider which of these
incentives – or combination of incentives – will best encourage research
into particular uses of carbon.

339. Guenther, supra note 121, at 1.
340. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 324.
341. Id. at 303.
342. Id.
343. Graetz, supra note 119, at 355. For instance, findings for the benefit-cost ratio for the
R&D credit have found ratios ranging from 0.293 to 2.0. Id. at 356-57.
344. See Shay, supra note 332, at 448, n.138 and accompanying text (noting that most of the
benefit from corporate R&D tax credits goes to large corporations).
345. Id. at 337. When researchers do have excess income against which to apply the credit,
then refundable tax credits function comparably to grants. Id. at 381.
346. Wei, supra note 167, at 45.
347. Galasso et al., supra note 164, at 345.
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A. Considerations of Markets and Timing
Besides the inherent strengths and weaknesses of these
incentive mechanisms, additional considerations impact their
effectiveness. Considerations regarding the decisionmakers best
positioned to set incentives’ values, the best parties to pay for them,
and the optimal timing of incentives all impact the determination of
optimal incentives. While not determinative, they do suggest which
incentives may be most effective in promoting particular innovations.
1. Markets Versus Centralized Decisionmakers
An important consideration in selecting among incentives
regards the party that will identify the targeted innovations and set the
value of the reward – markets or the government.348 As noted earlier,
patents rely upon markets to drive innovation and its rewards.349
Markets establish rewards for inventions through price signals.
Knowing this, private innovators can choose subjects for research and
receive subsidies and rewards for their efforts through the market.350
On the other hand, prizes, grants, and tax incentives rely upon
centralized actors—governments, peer-review panels, foundations,
etc.—to determine the direction of innovation and its compensation.351
Of course, market signals may not encourage certain innovations.
When market signals do not reflect social value, then incentives that
rely upon them fail to stimulate sufficient innovation.352
2. Paying for Innovation
As previously discussed, the parties who value innovations—
and, often, pay for them—differ with the particular incentive. Cross
subsidization occurs when nonusers of an invention pay the costs of the
users.353 When funded by general revenues, prizes, grants, and tax
348. Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 429 (2017).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 328.
353. Id. at 348.
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credits all involve cross subsidization by nonusers (typically
taxpayers).354
The government can, however, utilize cross
subsidization to alter innovation incentives.355 For instance, it can shift
some of the burden normally imposed on taxpayers to users through
targeted sales taxes.356 This is an example of an important concept—
decisionmakers can tweak aspects of incentives to alter their typical
effects.357
A related consideration involves risk. Unfunded researchers
pursuing an innovation not covered by a prize bear the entire risk that
their efforts will produce an invention generating sufficient demand to
assure a sufficient profit, or even to recoup their research costs.358
Conversely, grants and prizes shift the burden of unsuccessful research
onto the funding party (the government or private parties).359
3. The Timing of Incentives
Another consideration when choosing among incentive
mechanisms is the timing of the benefits provided. The timing of the
receipt of funds can be crucial. The financial benefits of grants and tax
credits occur ex ante the innovation; for prizes and patents, they arrive
ex post.360 Even when prizes or patents promise noticeably larger
returns, some parties may not be able to wait for ex post rewards.361
Some innovators, especially startups, may have trouble raising capital
or lack sufficient income to wait for ex post returns.362 Nonrefundable
tax credits also may have limited value to startups or other entities
lacking current income.363 Thus, the decision to utilize an ex ante or ex
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. Society utilizes cross subsidization in a number of other contexts, though usually it
operates in reverse fashion, with taxpayers subsidizing the costs borne by users of particular
services. Examples include subsidies for airline tickets and national park usage, among others. Id.
at 352.
357. Id. at 309.
358. Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 20.
359. Id. at 25 (illustrating the allocation of risk with different incentive schemes).
360. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 333.
361. Id. at 336.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 338. Recently, experience with renewable energy tax credits has demonstrated
the reduced impact such credits may have. With renewable energy being a relatively new
industry, many startups lacked sufficient income to take advantage of production tax credits and
investment tax credits provided to the industry. In many instances, developers needed to involve
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post reward can limit the parties able to pursue particular
innovations.364 Conversely, if innovators believe that an invention has
significant financial potential, the prospect of being restricted to a
limited ex ante award may not be sufficiently inviting.

B. Patents Versus Prizes or Patents and Prizes
Patents and prizes have been the primary driving forces behind
innovations for the past several centuries. Patents played a critical role
in the technological development since industrialization;365 prizes have
been instrumental in the development of numerous pivotal inventions
before industrialization and in recent decades.366 Because of their
prominence in encouraging innovation, a more thorough review of
these differences appears below. In short, patents use markets to
reward innovators.367 Conversely, prizes rely upon organizers to value
the award.368 As this discussion will suggest, the optimal combination
will turn on a range of factors.369
Despite their differences, or maybe because of them, patents and
prizes can work well together. The two incentives need not be mutually
exclusive; patents and prizes can be used as complements.370 Prizes can
supplement the return innovators are likely to receive from patents.371
This can be especially important for innovations that are pursued for
their social value, since markets are unlikely to fully recognize that
value.372 Of course, when governments or foundations utilize prizes to

outside investors to monetize their tax benefits. Molly F. Sherlock, THE RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 1 (November 27, 2018). In such
circumstances, a significant portion of the subsidy went to the outside investors and to efforts to
identify and attract them. Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner,
More Democratic Energy Future (Beyond Tax Credits), 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 324 (2014). As
a result, analysts concluded that one dollar of direct cash payment through grants had twice the
benefit of one dollar of tax credit. Id. at 322.
364. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 338.
365. Khan, supra note 126, at 648.
366. See supra Section II.B.2.
367. See supra Section II.A.2.
368. See supra Section II.B.1.
369. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 303.
370. Adler, supra note 149, at 15. In fact, grants and tax incentives also can serve as
complements to patents. The federal tax code, however, does preclude claiming credits for
research funded by a grant. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 316-17.
371. Adler, supra note 149, at 15.
372. Id.
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incentivize innovation, additional methods, such as patents, may still
be required for adequate diffusion of the invention. Another such
policy is the advance market commitment (AMC).373 Through an
AMC, the government commits to purchase a previously identified
quantity of an invention satisfying particular criteria.374
Certain other considerations become apparent from a review of
these incentives. First, prizes and patents require innovators to
shoulder their research costs;375 tax credits only help offset these
costs;376 grants, however, do provide ex ante support to reduce these
expenses.377 Economists, however, consider one of the strengths of
patents and prizes is that, as ex post incentives, they encourage
researchers to direct their efforts to projects with the best prospects.378
Second, when sufficient information is available to enable prizes and
grants to be as effective as patents in stimulating innovation, the former
are superior. This is because they avoid the deadweight loss resulting
from patents.379 Conversely, patents do impose the costs of inventions
upon their consumers; the other incentives, on the other hand, place
their financial burdens on taxpayers.380
Of course, governments can combine incentive systems to
overcome one method’s limitations, to reinforce methods’ impacts, or
to achieve multiple objectives. For instance, one approach used by

373. Id. at 44.
374. Id. AMCs developed to incentivize the production of vaccines for developing
countries. Global Health TECHS. COALITION, EXPLORING THE ROLE OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT
IN
A
FUTURE
ADVANCE
MARKET
COMMITMENT
1,
https://www.ghtcoalition.org/pdf/AMC-Policy-Brief.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2021). AMCs
guarantee a market for an invention at a specific price, id., but they do not guarantee that all
available products will be purchased. Center for Global Development, What Is an Advance
Market Commitment?, (February 18, 2005), available at https://www.cgdev.org/blog/whatadvance-market-commitment. Thus, they still enable purchasers to select the best product for
their purposes, thereby incentivizing inventors to continue innovating. Id. AMCs provide a
number of economic benefits, too. First, they increase revenues for inventors and reduce their
volatility. Vivid Economics, ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENTS FOR LOW-CARBON
DEVELOPMENT: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 18 (2009). Second, by assuring certainty regarding
demand, AMCs provide another means by which to stimulate investment. Id. at 16. Finally,
AMCs are especially appropriate for products that benefit society, but may not necessarily be
profitable. GHTC, supra at 3.
375. Adler, supra note 149, at 32.
376. See supra Section II.D.
377. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 311.
378. Id. at 334.
379. Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 73 THE AM. ECON. REV., 691-707, 703 (1983).
380. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 303.
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several countries is patent boxes.381 Patent boxes essentially combine
patents with tax credits. Specifically, they provide that the government
will apply a lower tax rate to profits earned from commercial use of
patented innovations.382 They are thus a form of subsidy applied to
income from patents.383 Patent boxes function similarly to a
combination of patents and tax credits. As of 2015, the tax codes of 16
countries—primarily in Europe, but also some in Asia—utilize patent
boxes.384
Analytically, patent boxes are output-driven tax incentives.385
Patent boxes involve two elements—their tax subsidy and the subsidy’s
scope. The subsidy comes either as a deduction or as an exemption
from taxable income or as the application of a preferential tax rate to
the qualifying patent income.386 The subsidy’s scope regards the kinds
of income, such as income from a patent, that qualifies for the
specialized treatment.387 Regardless of the specific procedures, patent
boxes effectively increase the return on patented inventions.
Governments utilize patent boxes to encourage research and
development leading to the patenting of inventions.388
Because most nations have enacted their patent boxes after 2007,
the available data regarding their effectiveness is limited.389 Patent
boxes do seem likely, however, to increase research activity.390 They
also have had a strong effect in attracting high value patents to the
jurisdictions utilizing them.391 Researchers have concluded that a 1%

381. Another approach used by several European countries is a super deduction for R&D
expenses. The super deduction allows taxpayers to deduct as R&D expenses amounts that exceed
the actual expenditure. Noked, supra note 119, at 116, n.20. Super deduction amounts range from
125% (Austria and the United Kingdom, the latter for large companies) to 150% (Denmark and
the United Kingdom, for small companies) to even a double deduction (Hungary and the Czech
Republic). Graetz, supra note 119, at 353-54. Over time, some of these countries have raised
their super deductions. The United Kingdom, for instance, increased its super deductions to
130% and 225%, respectively, while Hungary raised its to 400%. Id. at 355.
382. Guenther, supra note 121, at 1-2. The name of this tax benefit derives from the box
that taxpayers check to indicate that the identified income is sourced from qualifying patents. Id.
at 2.
383. Id. at 1.
384. Id. at 3. Efforts in the United States by the House Ways and Means Committee Chair
to enact patent boxes were unavailing. Graetz, supra note 119, at 369-71.
385. Alstadsæter, supra note 140, at 133.
386. Guenther, supra note 121, at 1.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 19.
390. Id. at 22.
391. Alstadsæter, supra note 140, at 135. “High value” patents are those with high earnings
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reduction in the tax rate applied to patent-derived income results in a
3% increase in patent applications.392
In conclusion, each of the incentives excels in particular situations.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, incentives can be used in
combination. This can help to achieve particular objectives or to
combine strengths of different policies.

C. Incentivizing CCU in Different Sectors
We can now consider which incentive or combinations of
incentives might best encourage research into the potential uses of
carbon discussed earlier. Because we utilize concrete in such large
quantities,393 CCU concrete can play a critical role in reducing CO2
emissions. Fortunately, scientists have completed most of the basic
research, and some enterprises have already developed cement carbon
utilization methods.394 However, although processes exist, they remain
costly, rendering CCU concrete non-competitive.395 Thus, innovators
need to conduct additional research, not to prove a theoretical concept,
but to reduce the costs of a process. Furthermore, this involves a
product for which the future market is potentially large, even though
the market currently may not fully value its environmental benefits.
For CCU concrete,the criteria for selecting incentives weigh in
favor of utilizing a combination of them. While market-based
incentives could prove to be lucrative for CCU concrete, they have
failed to produce a product that is cost competitive.396 In part, this may
be because the market fails to value sufficiently the environmental

potential. Id. High value patents have actually been more impacted by the tax advantages of
patent boxes than have lower value patents. Id. at 166.
392. Guenther, supra note 121, at 19. However, analyses suggest that some of this increase
derives from multinational corporations choosing jurisdictions with patent boxes as homes for
their patents. Alstadsæter, supra note 140, at 166. Indeed, patent boxes tend to discourage
inventors from moving to those jurisdictions. Id. at 168. To address this, one proposal involves
imposing a local-research requirement to receive the tax benefits of a patent box. Professors
Alstadsæter et al., conclude that such a requirement increases the level of local research
underlying these patents. Id
393. See supra, Section I.B.3.a. (noting that concrete is the most used human-made material,
and we use it on the same gigaton scale as we emit carbon).
394. Schneider, supra note 47, at 12516.
395. See supra, n.65 and accompanying text.
396. The “greenest” concretes, those which most reduce CO2 emissions, can cost twice as
much as conventional concrete. Lee, supra note 46.
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benefits of products such as CCU concrete.397 Accordingly, in light of
the significance of this product to CO2 reduction, utilizing more than a
single incentive would be appropriate.
Specifically, offering a prize in addition to preserving intellectual
property rights could accelerate development of CCU concrete.398
Prizes can incentivize R&D investments multiple times larger than the
amount of the prize.399 Furthermore, a prize will bring attention to the
need to develop CCU concrete, thereby possibly encouraging the
involvement of additional persons who might not otherwise have
contemplated this issue.400 Prizes would also be appropriate since they
can incentivize innovations with environmental benefits that the
market does not value.401 Finally, because of the importance of CCU
concrete, the government might take additional steps to encourage
work in this area. For instance, it could make patents for CCU
concrete more valuable by instituting patent boxes—in other words,
providing tax credits for income derived from these patents to increase
the profitability of these innovations.402 Another device to increase
profitability and thereby encourage such research is the super
deduction utilized by many European nations.403
CCU fuels raise a series of different challenges. Although they
carry the promise of providing the second largest future market for
CCU products,404 they still suffer from gaps of knowledge concerning
engineering and processes.405 Conversion costs of CO2 into synthetic

397. Mandel, supra note 181, at 58.
398. Adler, supra note 149, at 15 (noting that a prize would augment the incentive to
innovate already provided by the opportunity to secure a patent).
399. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (noting that the $10 million Ansari X
Prize incentivized $100 million in related research investments).
400. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text (recognizing that prizes attract
participation by persons who typically would not pursue a particular innovation).
401. Adler, supra note 149, at 14.
402. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 122, at 332. Because of the potentially large future
market for price-competitive CCU concrete, such patent boxes should probably decline over time
to avoid a windfall benefit. Besides incentivizing research to reduce the production costs of this
concrete, the government also could implement policies to reduce their effective market price.
This could encourage sales and engender cost reductions resulting from economies of scale and
learning by doing. See supra note 83. These policies could include content mandates that require
that specified portions of concrete consist of the carbon capturing type. Alternatively, tax credits
or other policies that could reduce the effective purchase price of these products should also be
helpful. Such policies could temporarily lower the cost of CCU, thereby increasing its purchase
and resulting in the cost benefits of increased scale.
403. See supra note 381.
404. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 11.
405. The Royal Society, supra note 21, at 14.
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fuels also remain prohibitive.406 Since the knowledge gap involves
processes, centralized decision makers may not be able to project
accurately the eventual value of such developments. Similarly, markets
are unlikely to value the environmental benefits of such innovations.
Finally, industry is anticipated to pursue these fuels as greater
knowledge is gained, which will lower the risk of investing in this
research.407
Accordingly, ex ante incentives, such as grants, that reduce the
costs (and the risks) of research would be helpful. Grants can help
direct research to specific subjects.408 Even though some of these
technologies and products already exist, their costs still remain
prohibitive.409 As with other CCU products, policies that increase
production or temporarily lower prices—mandates,410 AMCs, and
price subsidies—will also be beneficial. Finally, tax credits that reduce
the high capital costs of fuel development and processing would also
lower the costs, and the risks, of these R&D investments.
While CCU could be used by the chemicals industry, scientists
project the domestic market to be limited.411 Since many established
entities participate in the chemicals industry,412 the need for ex ante
incentives is reduced. Moreover, the chemical industry is already one
of the largest generators of patented inventions.413
Thus,
complementary incentives could help to steer the industry to pursue
CCU uses. For instance, tax credits can help reduce the costs of
research. Because many enterprises involved in the chemical industry
are established businesses, they often have the income that tax credits
could offset, providing the necessary incentive.414 Since the industry
406. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 11.
407. Lucci, supra note 13, at 5.
408. Wei, supra note 167, at 45.
409. Bobeck, supra note 17, at 13.
410.
Examples of mandates applicable here are the LCFS and AFS requirements
implemented by a number of states. See supra note 78.
411. Jacobson & Lucas, supra note 43, at 4.
412. The domestic chemical industry consists of more than 13,000 firms generating sales
exceeding $765 billion. International Trade Administration’s Industry & Analysis Unit,
Chemical Spotlight: The Chemical Industry in the United States, last visited July 31, 2021,
available at https://www.selectusa.gov/chemical-industry-united-states.
413. Alstadsæter, supra note 140, at 139.
414.
Tax credits for R&D are especially appropriate for an industry represented
substantially by large, established interests. Large businesses have several recognized advantages
in investing in R&D, including a greater ability to diversify risks, better access to financing, and
more resources to apply to patent registration and protection. Shay, supra note 332, at 448. Not
surprisingly, corporations with revenues exceeding $250 million receive nearly all (84%) of the
corporate R&D credit. Id. at n.138.
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already develops many patentable inventions, the government should
encourage the development of CCU-related patents. Patent boxes and
super deductions, which would reduce the taxes on income from these
taxes, could also help encourage the industry to increase its efforts in
this area.
Some algae-based products might most effectively be
incentivized by prizes. Prizes are especially appropriate for
incentivizing high-risk research on technologies that are still at their
earliest stages.415 Scientists still need to conduct basic research
regarding several potential algae applications—such as biofuels and
bioplastics—to establish their viability at acceptable costs.416 Technical
challenges and limitations still preclude these avenues.417 While
centralized decision making might not be advantageous, the
government might be best positioned to fund this basic research until
directions and products become more apparent. Thus, prizes—which
encourage a wide range of participation, perspectives, and directions—
would be particularly appropriate.418 Furthermore, because of the
uncertainty of the paths forward, prizes have several advantages. First,
they are likely to encourage participation by additional persons than
might otherwise conduct this research.419 Second, and related to the
first, prizes are more likely to engender a wide range of solutions,
including some not contemplated by the prize organizers.420 Finally,
algae uses are still at their initial stages, so prizes are particularly wellsuited incentives.421 Prizes would be superior to patents because of the
latter’s provision of exclusive rights, which tends to discourage followon inventions.422 Indeed, organizers could even break the prizes into a
series of smaller prizes to further encourage follow-on or cumulative
inventions.423
Scientists have postulated a number of other possible CCU
415. Williams, supra note 134, at 10.
416. Bobeck, supra note 17, at vi.
417. NAS, supra note 12, at 121.
418. Also, because of the likely involvement of startup entities, methods that reduce ex ante
the costs of research, such as grants, might be especially helpful. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note
122, at 311.
419. Moser & Nicholas, supra note 213, at 785.
420.
Harrison’s clock solution to The Longitude Act’s prize and Lindbergh’s solo
transatlantic flight are two prominent examples of unanticipated solutions to earlier prizes. See
supra, Section II.B.2.
421. Williams, supra note 134, at 10 (noting the appropriateness of prizes for high-risk
research on early-stage technologies).
422. Clancy & Moschini, supra note 130, at 211.
423. Moser & Nicholas, supra note 213, at 786.
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applications.424 However, many of these uses remain theoretical,. so
decentralized decisionmaking would be best because no clear direction
exists. Effectively, this would track the Carbon X Prize.425 But, where
that prize targeted a method to utilize the greatest amount of carbon
possible, this would be targeted more toward novel uses of CCU
applications with promise. In other words, the objective is clear but
the best approach to achieve that objective is not, which is the ideal
situation to utilize prizes.426 The government also should provide ex
ante funding, such as grants, to encourage work by startups and other
small enterprises to provide a wide range of perspectives and
potentially generate diverse uses.427
IV.

CONCLUSION

Avoiding the worst effects of climate change will require that we
undertake a range of actions. CCU can play a significant role, directly
and indirectly, in accelerating our efforts to reduce atmospheric
carbon. However, before it can play this role, significant advancements
are necessary. We have the policy tools to incentivize this research,
and we need to implement them soon.

424. See supra, Section I.B.3.e (including various food and manufacturing processes, among
others).
425. See supra, Section II.B.3.
426. Burstein & Murray, supra note 128, at 415.
427. Indeed, at least one commentator considers grants to be potentially “the most effective
driver for relevant [CCU] research and deployment.” Kai Jiang et al., China's Carbon Capture,
Utilization and Storage (CCUS) Policy: A Critical Review, 119 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REV., 1-15, 11 (2020).

